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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case 1

Respondent Elmore County originally hired Appellant Cherri Nix on June 1, 2007.
(R. Vol. 1, p. 36) Subject to her employment and the Elmore County Personnel Policy (hereinafter

"ECPP"), she was a probationary employee for one-yearuntilJune 1, 2008. (R. Vol. 1, p. 180) After
this period, Nix began having issues with her work performance and inaccuracies in her time cards,
and Elmore County began to warn her of such through verbal and written notices beginning in
January 2011. (R. Vol. 1, p. 194-200). On February 1, 2012, Nix was provided with a "NOTICE
OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION-NOTICE OF LAST CHANCE," by her supervisor, Vence Parsons,
which placed her on a one-year probationary status. (Id.) As conditions of her probation, this notice
advised Nix, "[y Jou are, and remain, an at-will employee," and also that, "you may be subject to
immediate termination at any time during the probationary period." (R. Vol. 1, p. 199) Ultimately,
on April 30, 2012, Nix was terminated by Elmore County for failure to remedy the performance
deficiencies as outline in the Notice of Last Chance. (R. Vol. 1, p. 68-69)
Nix made a written request to meet with the Elmore County Board of County
Commissioners (hereinafter "BOCC") on May 4, 2012.

(R. Vol. 1, p. 70)

Through further

correspondence with Nix' s then counsel, Nix asserted she had the right to a pre-termination hearing
pursuant to the ECPP. (R. Vol. 1, p. 71-72) As Nix was an at-will probationary employee subject
to immediate termination at any time, she was not entitled to any pre-termination hearing. (R. Vol.

Respondent refers to and incorporates by reference the procedural background in the
District Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for additional factual
and procedural history of this case. (R. Vol. 2, p. 224-225; R. Vol. 3, p. 401-402)
1
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1, p. 74) However, Elmore County still noticed a hearing for June 11, 2012 where the BOCC would
discuss any claims of unlawful discrimination that Nix may have had in connection with her
termination. (R. Vol. I, p. 73) Elmore County also allowed Nix' s legal counsel the opportunity to
present to the BOCC "any further legal authority you have in support for your request for an
evidentiary hearing." (R. Vol. 1, p. 74)
At the June 11, 2012 hearing with the BOCC, Nix confirmed that she had no claims
of unlawful discrimination in connection with her termination. (R. Vol. 1, p. 75) Nix was then also
permitted to argue (through legal counsel) that her due process rights were deprived by her not being
allowed a pre-termination hearing. (R. Vol. 1, p. 76) In its written decision of June 18, 2012, the
BOCC ruled:
At the time of Ms. Nix' s termination, she was a probationary
employee with the county. A probationary employee of the county is
expressly an "at-will" employee. The ECPP states that the
probationary period "shall be utilized for closely observing the
employee's work ... and for rejecting an introductory employee
whose performance is not satisfactory. To construe that the ECPP
creates anything other than "at-will" status for a probationary
employee, or that the probationary employee is entitled to a hearing
upon termination, would render the probationary employee concept
meaningless under the ECPP. Probationary employees are not
entitled to a hearing under the ECPP.
(R. Vol. I, p. 76) The BOCC then referenced Romero v. Plummer, CV-2010-113, Idaho Fourth

Judicial District (April 8, 2011), where that district court held that "[p]robationary and casual
employees are not entitled to any hearing.'' (R. Vol. 1, p. 76; see also R. Vol. 1, p. 147-156) The
BOCC upheld Nix's April 30, 2012 termination. (R. Vol. 1, p. 77)
Nix then filed a civil complaint against Elmore County on December 10, 2012,
alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the ECPP, wrongful discharge in violation of her "for
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cause" employment status, and wrongful discharge in violation of the Idaho Protection of Public
Employees Act. (R. Vol. 1, p. 10-16) Nix specifically alleged that she was not afforded a predeprivation hearing, that she was not an at-will employee and was therefore wrongfully terminated
without cause, and that she was forced to improperly alter her time cards and terminated because she
refused to do so. (Id.)
1.

Nix's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Nix moved for partial summary judgment soon after filing her complaint where she
argued that she was not afforded any pre-deprivation hearing as allegedly provided by the ECPP, and
also alleged a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in conjunction with
the County not providing any pre-deprivation hearing. 2 (R. Vol. 1, p. 79-97) The district court
denied this motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Nix was an at-will employee subject
to immediate termination and not entitled to a pre-termination hearing, in that she had failed to
establish that "she had a contract to be employed for a specified time or which limits the reason(s)
she may be terminated." (R. Vol. 2, p. 227) The District Court also noted that "[t]he existence of
a grievance procedure in an employee policy manual is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
employment at-will and create an issue of fact for trial." (R. Vol. 2, p. 228) Therefore,"[ s]ince there
was no contract, [Nix] was an at-will employee and [Elmore County] had the ability to end the
employment relationship at any time without incurring liability." (R. Vol. 2, p. 228)
Also, the District Court established that Plaintiff failed to show an issue of material
fact that Elmore County breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Vol. 2,

The majority of Nix' s argument supporting her motion for partial summary judgment is
repeated in her appellate briefing here before the Court. (Compare R. Vol. 1, p. 91-96, and
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12-16)
2
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p. 229-231) In its analysis, the Court established that while probationary status may not have been
clearly defined in the ECPP, the Notice of Disciplinary Action did so by stating the express terms
of Nix's probation, including immediate termination. (R. Vol. 2, p. 231)

Through the District

Court's legal interpretation of the ECPP, Elmore County was not required to provide an appeal
hearing to Nix, and therefore there was no violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Id.

2.

Elmore County's Motion for Summary Judgment

Based on the legal determinations made in the District Court's denial of Nix' s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment that Nix was an at-will employee and not entitled to any pretermination hearing, and that there was no violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, Elmore County later moved for full summary judgment on those same grounds and
prevailed. (R. Vol. 2, p. 250-255, 378-388; R. Vol. 3, p. 401-409) The District Court reaffirmed
its prior denial of Nix's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the legal findings therein in its
ruling. (R. Vol. 3, p. 406) Nix did not present any new evidence sufficient to create an issue of
material fact and to avoid summary judgment. (Id.) The District Court also granted summary
judgment with respect to Nix' s additional cause of action regarding allegations of a violation of the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, ("IPPEA"), as being barred by the appropriate statute of
limitations found in LC. § 6-2105(2). (R. Vol. 3, p. 407) Elmore County later moved for fees and
costs as the prevailing party, and in light of Nix' s failure to object to the motion, the District Court
granted fees and costs to Elmore County. (R. Vol. 3, p. 415-420)
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II.
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL

Elmore County is entitled to an award of its fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code§§ 12-107, 12-117, 12-120. [ALL HIGHLIGHTED SECTIONS HERENOTINTABLE
OF AUTHORITIES] Elmore County is a "political subdivision" within the meaning of the statute
and is therefore entitled to an award of fees and costs if the Court finds it is the prevailing party and
that Nix, in bringing her appeal, acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. I.C. § 12-117(1 ).
In addition, "[t]he mandatory attorney fee provisions of I.C. § 12-120 govern on appeal as well as

in the trial court." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716,
721 (2005) (quoting Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 263 (2000)).
Nix's Counts I and II related to allegations of wrongful termination and a violation
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both relating to Nix' s employment agreement with
Elmore County. (R. Vol. 1, p. 10-14) Therefore, attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) are
appropriate for Elmore County because these claims both are best classified as "commercial
transactions." Pursuant to Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 141 Idaho 233 (2004), the
prevailing party in an action based on an alleged breach of the employment contract is entitled to
attorney's fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3 ). The plaintiff in Jenkins asserted that his termination
was wrongful in that it was not for cause and he was therefore a contract employee, and that his
termination violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 237, 240-243.
Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiff was, in fact, an at-will employee, and found that his
termination was proper pursuant to his at-will status, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Id. Attorney's fees were awarded to the defendant employer as it prevailed in summary
judgment with respect to these employment claims. Id. at 243-44. The court specifically noted that
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"the gravamen of this case was a contract action," and therefore the defendant employer was entitled
to fees associated with defending that action. Id. Accordingly, as the Jenkins court found that
attorney's fees were applicable in that instance pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), there is no factual or
legal basis for this Court to not follow Jenkins and similarly grant attorney's fees in the current
instance on appeal.
III.
ARGUMENT

The District Court properly denied Nix's motion for partial summary judgment as
well as granting Elmore County's motion for full summary judgment. Elmore County respectfully
requests that the Court affirm the judgment for Elmore County and grant fees and costs pursuant to
this appeal.

A.

Standard of Review

When reviewing an appeal of an order granting summary judgment, the standard of
review is the same as that used by the trial court in ruling on the motion. Summers v. Cambridge
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955 (2004). Summary judgment is proper where "the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56( c). When considering a motion for summary judgment, all controverted
facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,
769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991 ). Moreover, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences and
conclusions in favor of the party resisting the motion. Id.
The party moving for summary judgment initially bears the burden of establishing
both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 6.

matter of law. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820 P.2d at 364. This burden may be met by establishing
the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial.
Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308,311, 882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such an absence of
evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence
or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that proof of a particular
element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.
App. 2000).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of fact, the burden
shifts to the nonmoving party to produce admissible evidence, which sets forth specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue of fact on the elements challenged by the moving party.
I.R.C.P. 56(e); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 21, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 1300 (1990);
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530 31,887 P.2d 1034, 1037 38 (1994). An
opposing party may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings nor may the opposing
party's case rest on speculation or conclusory assertions. Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv.,
136 Idaho 835,839, 41 P.3d 263,267 (2002); McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769,820 P.2d at 364. The party
opposing the motion must produce evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to show that there is indeed
a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Olsen, 117 Idaho at 720, 791 P.2d at 1299.

B.

The District Court Did Not Err In Determining that the ECPP Did Not
Require Nix to Receive a Pre-Termination Hearing Prior to Her
Discharge Based on Her Probationary Status.

Nix has asserted that the ECPP requires her to have a pre-termination hearing, but this
assertion would create a contractual obligation where one does not exist. Nix's main argument is
that the ECPP required her to receive a pre-termination hearing, and as she did not receive this
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hearing, her due process rights were violated. 3 (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 10) She asserts that
should this pre-termination hearing be required, that Elmore County violated both her due process
rights or the implied covenant of good faith in fair dealing in not providing her this hearing.

(Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 10) On appeal, Nix asserts that the District Court's "characterization
of the probationary status given Nix by her supervisor on February 1, 2012 was error." (Appellant's

Opening Brief, p. 11) This argument comes from Nix based on two incorrect legal assumptions that
she makes: 1) that the ECPP was contractual in nature and had the effect of an employment
agreement between Nix and Elmore County, and 2) that Nix's disciplinary probation status (as
opposed to an introductory probation status) afforded her a pre-termination hearing. (Appellant's

Opening Brief, p. 11-16)
As the District Court held, the disclaimer language in the ECPP leaves no question
of material fact that there was no intent by the county commissioners to include the ECPP as part
of her employment agreement orto create enforceable contract rights. (See R. Vol. 1, p. 165; R. Vol.
2, p. 227-228) Nix had the burden to establish the existence of this contract, and she failed to do so.
(R. Vol. 2, p. 228) Nix had no contractual rights to any provisions found in the ECPP, and this
would include any pre-termination appeal offered in the ECPP. In addition, as an at-will employee
at the time of her termination, there were no limitations on the termination of the employment

Nix has set forth three issues on appeal. Issue # 1 is presented as "Did the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing require a pre-termination hearing prior to the discharge of Nix as an
employee of Elmore County?" (Appellant's Opening Brief; p. 10) Issue #3 is presented as, "Did
an agreement regarding employment terms including the right to a due process pre-termination
hearing exist regardless of whether or not Nix was an employee at will?" (Id.) As these two
issues are essentially the same issue and both are responded to with the same legal reasoning,
Elmore County will address both issues #1 and #3 in this first section, while leaving the
remaining issue #2 and its distinct legal analysis for the following section.
3
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relationship between Nix and Elmore County, and, as such, she was not offered any hearing under
state law. Also, as a probationary employee at the time of her termination, she was not entitled to
any pre-termination hearing as the conditions of her probation allowed for immediate termination
at any time during the probation period and that any "for cause" probationary status is not
contemplated by the ECPP. Consequently, Nix cannot legally prevail on her appeal and Elmore
County respectfully requests affirmation of the decision of the lower court.
1.

No Contractual Entitlement to Pre-Termination Hearing

There is insufficient legal basis for the Court to reasonably infer that there is any
contractual obligation that leaves Elmore County liable to Nix for not providing her, as an at-will
employee, an appeal hearing prior to her termination. The ECPP is not a contract. (R. Vol. 1, p.
165) Due to the lack of any employment contract to the contrary, Nix was undeniably an at-will
employee at the time of her termination, and as such had no contractually created property interest
in continuing employment. This would preclude any property interest in any pre-termination
hearing. Idaho law establishes that where there is a clear contractual disclaimer in a personnel
policy, there is no question of material fact in the lack of intent by the employer for that personnel
policy to be considered as part of the employment agreement. Mitchell v. Zilog, 125 Idaho 709, 71213, 874 P.2d 520, 523-24 (1994). Thus, due to the clear contractual disclaimer in the ECPP at issue
here, there can be no issue of material fact that there was no intent by Elmore County to include the
policy or its provisions as a part of Nix' s employment agreement. Without any contractual provision
to rely upon, there is no entitlement to any termination procedure sufficient to maintain a wrongful
termination action.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9.

"Under the federal constitution, at-will employees possess no protected property
rights and therefore are not entitled to due process before being terminated." Lawson v. Umatilla

County, 139 F.3d 690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d
898, 904 (9th Cir.1993)). In Idaho, employment is at-will unless an employee is hired pursuant to
a contract that specifies the duration of employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may
be terminated. See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 387 (Idaho 2005). Without a
contractual agreement limiting a party's right to terminate the employment relationship, "either party
may terminate it at any time or for any reason without incurring liability." Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125
Idaho 709, 713, 874 P.2d 520, 523 (1994) (emphasis added).

This presumption of at-will

employment may be rebutted if the parties intend that an employee handbook or manual will
constitute an element of an employment contract, but at-will status is retained when the employee
manual contains a superceding disclaimer that "specifically negates any intention on the part of the
employer to have [the handbook or manual] become a part of the employment contract." Zilog, 125
Idaho at 712-13, 874 P.2d at 523-24 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also Metca(l

v. lntermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 624-25, 778 P.2d 744, 746-47 (1989) (discussing
presumption of at-will employment). The valid disclaimer in Zilog read, in part, as follows:
This guide is not to be construed as a contract between Zilog and its
employees and does not in any way imply or create any rights,
contractual or otherwise, on behalf of Zilog's employees. Zilog may,
at its sole discretion, alter or amend this guide or portions thereof at
any time.

Zilog, 125 Idaho at 713, 874 P.2d at 524. Thus, pursuant to well-established Idaho law, when an
employment manual or personnel policy specifically negates any intention to become part of the
employment contract, there is no question of fact that the presumption of at-will employment
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relationship remains regardless of the language within that personnel policy. When an employee is
at-will, there are no limitations on the termination of the employment relationship, and there cannot
be any inferred contractual protections creating "for-cause" status from any document, as the very
nature of being "at-will" indicates that there is no express or implied contractual limitation on the
termination of the employment relationship.
This Court has recently addressed this issue and made clear that where, as here, the
alleged source of a limitation on the at-will employment relationship is the employer's policies, the
"policies must manifest an intent that they become part of the employment agreement." Bollinger

v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 639, 272 P.3d 1263, 1269 (2012) (citing
Metcalf, 116 Idaho at 624 ). Prior holdings from this Court explain the reasoning for this established
law:
[A]n employer may provide guidelines, which are necessary
conditions for continued employment, and avoid having them read as
a guarantee for a specific term of employment or placing limits on the
reasons for discharge.
An employer's custom of only terminating employees for good cause
is likewise not sufficient to support a claim of an implied contract
term eliminating the employer's right to terminate at will. As the
Court of Appeals in Atwood [v. Western Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 234,
239, 923 P.2d 479,484 (Ct. App. 1996)] reasoned:
As a matter of policy, this Court will not consider evidence
that a company does not usually fire employees without a
good reason as by itself establishing that the company does
not maintain an at-will employment policy. To do otherwise
would encourage employers to occasionally fire employees
for no other reason than to show that they maintain the
freedom to do so.
If we were to accept the . . . contention that an employer who

normally only fires employees for good cause should be held to have
forfeited the ability to claim an at-will relationship with employees,
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the rule would necessarily swallow up the at-will presumption.
Employers would be forced to arbitrarily fire an employee
periodically just to reaffirm their right to discharge for no reason.
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 242, 108 P.3d 380, 389 (2005) (internal citations

omitted) (bracketed language added) (emphasis added). Here, due to the contractual disclaimer
found in the ECPP, any provisions found in the ECPP itself are simply guidelines, but do not place
limits on the reasons or procedure for discharge, regardless of the language used.
In Lawson v. Umatilla County, 139 F.3d 690, 691 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit

considered a similar factual situation as applied to Oregon case law that mirrors applicable Idaho
law. There, a county employee alleged that his permanent classification status and the county
personnel policy afforded him protections such that he was no longer an at-will employee, and
created a protected property interest in his continuing employment. Id. at 691. However, the
Personnel Policies there also included a disclaimer that the personnel policies were not an
employment contract with the employee. Lawson v. Umatilla County, 139 F.3d 690,691 (9th Cir.
1998). Consequently, the court there held that the disclaimer would "retain the employee's at-will
status even when the policies also provide specific reasons for termination and for an appeals

process." Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
The personnel policy at issue in this case is not a contract. (R. Vol. 1, p. 165) Thus,
it cannot rebut the presumption of at-will employment. The disclaimer language found in the ECPP
is similar to the language upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court as a valid disclaimer of any limitation
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on the at-will employment relationship in Zilog, supra, and Parker v. Boise Telco Federal Credit

Union, 129 Idaho 248, 250-51 (Ct. App. 1996). 4 The ECPP reads:

THIS PERSONNEL POLICY IS NOT A CONTRACT. NO
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WITH ELMORE COUNTY
WILL BEVALID UNLESS IT IS SIGNED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PROPER PROCEDURES BY A SPECIFICALLY
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNING
BOARD AND UNLESS IT IS SIGNED AND CONTAINS THE
NAME OF THE EMPLOYEE WHO WOULD BE
BENEFITTED BY THE CONTRACT.
(R. Vol. 1, p. 165) (emphasis in original) This language validly disclaims any possible intent by

Elmore County to have the policy become part of the employment contract with Nix, and thus
pursuant to Zilog, supra, there is no question of fact that the ECPP does not negate the existing
presumption from Idaho law that Nix was an at-will employee. This superceding disclaimer
precludes any language in the ECPP that could seem to create any contractual limitation on Nix' s
employment relationship. See Lawson, 139 F.3d at 693; Zilog, supra.

4

The disclaimer in Parker reads as follows:
The contents contained in this handbook are presented as a matter
of information only and are not to be construed as a contract
between the employer and its employees. The [Boise Telco Federal
Credit Union] reserves the right to unilaterally and without notice
add to, change or delete, supplement, or rescind all or any part of
the practices, procedures, or benefits described in the handbook as
it deems circumstances require. I agree to conform to the rules and
regulations of the Credit Union. I also understand that my
employment and compensation can be terminated, with or without
cause, and with or without notice at any time, at the option of
either the Credit Union or myself.

Parker v. Boise Telco Federal Credit Union, 129 Idaho 248, 250-51 (Ct. App. 1996).
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Additionally, the broad scope of the disclaimer language in the ECPP is supported
by the language of the disclaimer itself. That language states that the only way for an employee to
avoid the contractual disclaimer is through a separate contract which requires the name of the
employee and the signature of both a specifically authorized representative of Elmore County and
the employee herself. (R. Vol. 1, p. 165) A solitary statement within the ECPP, regardless of the
language used, does not meet this requirement to elevate its status to a contractual provision to avoid
the superceding disclaimer. Therefore, the only way the presumption of Nix' s at-will employment
status can be rebutted is if she can show an actual contract of employment with Elmore County,
signed in accordance with proper procedures by a specifically authorized representative of the
governing board, and signed by Nix herself, which indicates an intent of the parties to include the
ECPP as part of that employment contract. Similarly, without such a contract indicating an intent

to contractually provide an appeals hearing specifically to Nix, she has no valid claim of a violation
of a contractual right that does not exist. As there is no evidence that such a contract exists, the
presumption of at-will employment remains with no limitations on the employment relationship, and
there also is no contractually provided right in continued employment.

Nix argues that whether she was a permanent contract employee or an employee at
will is immaterial, but this simply ignores the definition of being an employee "at-will." There are
no limitations on the termination of the at-will employment relationship. There is no Idaho case law
that supports any limitation on termination for an at-will employee. Thus, by simple logic, if Nix
was, in fact, an at-will employee, there were no limitations on either Elmore County's or Nix' s right
to terminate the employment relationship, which would negate any implied opportunity to receive
a pre-termination hearing.
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Nix also seemingly asserts that she had a continuing property interest m her
employment based on her reliance on McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384 (9th Cir.
1989). (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 15-16) This undefined, general assertion of a vague property
interest is an inappropriate attempt to create an issue of material fact and is insufficient to withstand
summary judgment. See Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 (2009). As an employee
must have more than a "mere hope of continued employment" in order to have a property interest
in employment in Idaho, it would follow that Nix must have more than a mere conclusory statement
as basis for some property right's existence. See Harkness v. City of Burley, 1 IO Idaho 353, 356
( 1986). The only basis for any and all of Nix' s alleged due process claims stems directly from the
ECPP, and specifically, its mention of an appeal hearing to full-time regular employees. If this
property interest does not come from the ECPP, it must come from "ordinance, or by implied
contract." See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976). There is no evidence of either in this
case, and there is no factual basis in the record for Nix' s property interest.
McGraw is also factually distinguishable from Nix' s claims. There, the plaintiff was
never placed on any probation that included any conditions such as immediate termination, like Nix
clearly was. Instead, she was promoted to a new position, which she accepted but later wished to
go back to her prior position. Instead, her employer terminated her in the "promotional probationary
period," while the Ninth Circuit stated that she had a "constitutionally protected property interest"
in continued employment at her prior position. Nix had no similar expectation in her continued
employment because she was specifically placed on probation and informed that she would be
subject to immediate termination pursuant to that probation. She was not on a "promotional

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 15.

probationary period," but rather was placed on disciplinary probation for poor work performance,
and had no continued expectation in her employment.
Nix also incorrectly assumes that she is provided automatic procedural due process
protections as a public at-will employee, ignoring that any such inherent procedural due process
protections only arise when there is an already existing protected property interest in continued
employment based on contract or statute. 5

Under the federal constitution, this creates a

constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment in that a permanent employee's
employment is not terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer. (See Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In other words, when an employee is "for cause." There is
no such basis in Idaho law that creates a "for-cause" presumption of employment for the majority
of public employees, such as Nix.

While there are examples of public employees in other

circumstances who are statutorily "for-cause," Nix here does not have such a status.
For example, in Boudreau v. City of Wendell, 147 Idaho 609,612 (2009), the issue
addressed by this Court was whether a statutorily "appointed officer" of a city could use the
provisions of a personnel policy to preempt his at-will employment status as established for his
"appointed officer" position in J.C. § 50-204. However, this case stands for the presumption that
local governments can not override statutes as enacted by the legislature. Id. Thus, Boudreau was
actually a "for-cause" employee based on his statutory "appointed officer" position, and the local

5In

the context of Nix's filed Complaint and her current briefing, Elmore County only
understands Nix's claims to be contractual and based in Idaho state law. Nix's reliance on
federal law or constitutional property interest principles without some connection to similar state
law is misplaced in that it is largely applicable only where there is a constitutionally protected
property interest in continued employment. As Nix has raised no constitutional claims at any
time, such reliance on this federal law is unpersuasive.
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government could not override that statutory position through the provisions of their personnel
policy. Nix here was not an "appointed officer" under Idaho statute, nor does her claim involve any
applicable state statute, and thus any public employee "for cause" analysis as applied in Boudreau
would not be applicable here. In fact, previously cited Idaho case law indicates that Nix is presumed
to be an at-will employee unless she can provide an employment contract that states otherwise. As
the personnel policy at issue here is specifically disclaimed as a contract, it cannot be considered as
such for purposes of Nix' s employment.

2.

Nix's Probationary Status Did Not Entitle Her to a PreTermination Hearing.

Nix also had no entitlement to a pre-termination hearing due to her probationary
status and the conditions imposed in that probation. It is undisputed that Nix was a probationary
employee at the time of her termination. She had been placed on a one-year probation on February
1, 2012, for poor work performance, and informed at that time in her "Notice of Discipline-Last
Chance" that she "was, and remain, an at-will employee," and that she could be terminated
immediately at any time during the one-year probationary period. (R. Vol. 1, p. 199) Nix was
terminated on April 30, 2012, during the one-year probationary period, for failure to meet the
working requirements established with respect to the Notice of Last Chance. (R. Vol. 1, p. 68-69)
In their June 18, 2012, written decision on termination, the BOCC established:
A probationary employee of the county is expressly an "at-will"
employee.
The ECPP (employment manual) states that the
probationary period "shall be utilized for closely observing the
employee's work ... and for rejecting an introductory employee
whose performance is not satisfactory." To construe that the ECPP
creates anything other than "at-will" status for a probationary
employee, or that the probationary employee is entitled to a hearing
upon termination, would render the probationary employee concept
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meaningless under the ECPP. Probationary employees are not
entitled to a hearing under the ECPP.
(R. Vol. I, p. 76) The Board continued to explain that in Romero v. Plummer, CV-2010-113, Idaho
Fourth Judicial District (April 8, 2011), 6 the court there stated that the ECPP makes it clear that all
Elmore County employees are at-will, and probationary employees specifically are not entitled to
any hearing. The decision in Romero court made no distinction between introductory probation or
disciplinary probation. Thus, the decision of the BOCC at that time was to deny Nix any pretermination hearing because, as a probationary employee, she had no such opportunity.
Ultimately, Nix attempts to argue a distinction between a "new probation employee"
and a "disciplinary probation employee," and to then attach "at-will" employment status to the "new
probation employee" and to create a "for cause" status to the "disciplinary probation employee."
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12-16) While probationary employees are discussed in two different
sections of the Personnel Manual, there is no language that would support Nix's inference that there
is such a difference in "at-will" status between the two. In fact, in the section of the ECPP entitled,
"Levels of Disciplinary Actions Available," probation is simply listed as one of five disciplinary
steps which may be taken in response to personnel policy violations, with no further explanation
provided. (R. Vol. 1, p. 191)

Nix argues that "no language is found in the section of the ECPP

entitled 'Levels of Disciplinary Actions Available' which states that an employee placed on
disciplinary status of probation is thereby converted into an employee at-will or for that matter, is
a new or 'introductory' employee." (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 15) This is because there is no
language explaining the levels of disciplinary actions available at all. Thus, by Nix' sown admission,

6

See R. Vol. 1, p. 147-156.
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the language in the ECPP is, at best, inconclusive as to what the intent of "disciplinary probation"
might be, but surely this evidences an absence of any intent to create the dual probationary structure
that Nix asserts she is entitled to.
However, Nix' s attempt at distinguishing these two types of probation is irrelevant
because Nix' s notice of her one-year disciplinary probation clearly states that part of the conditions
of her probation were that Nix was, and would remain, an at-will employee, and could be
immediately terminated at any time during the one-year probationary period. (R. Vol. 1, p. 199)
Therefore, it was clarified in her Notice of Last Chance and probation that she was an at-will
employee subject to immediate termination at any time. Thus, any argument that Nix was under the
impression that she was a "for-cause" employee while she was on her probationary one-year period
ignores the existing presumption of at-will status and the clear language of her probationary
conditions, which were provided to her more than two months before her termination. As her
probation clearly classified Nix as an at-will employee who could be immediately terminated at any
time, it is clear that she would not be offered any pre-termination appeal hearing.
Defendant's Personnel Policy sets forth pro-employee conditions of employment that
generally encourage positive employee relations. The disclaimers and statements in the ECPP
indicate that it is intended to be a general statement of policy, not a contract. Idaho precedent, along
with this Court's own prior holding, is clear: a policy must indicate an intent that it become part of
the employment agreement to have contractual force and to overcome the presumption of at-will
employment. Where, as here, there is contract disclaimer language specifically negating such intent,
the at-will presumption stands.
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C.

The District Court Did Not Err In Determining that Elmore County
Followed Proper Procedure in Placing Nix on Probation with Specific
Terms of Immediate Termination.

The District Court held as a matter of law that the ECPP was not "intended to create
enforceable contract rights," and that there was no material issue of fact the ECPP did not constitute
an employment contract for Nix. (R. Vol. 2, p. 228) Again, Nix has provided no evidence that
would overturn that holding. Nix argues that her supervisor's actions in terminating her were some
sort of alleged unauthorized change, modification, or interpretation of the ECPP. This is a moot
point, because there is no preliminary contractual basis for the ECPP to have such authority. The
final analysis, which remains unrebutted by Nix's evidence in the record, is that she was an at-will
employee without any other employment contract, and Elmore County could terminate the
employment relationship at any time pursuant to her disciplinary probation.

However, even

assuming that the provisions of the ECPP created some implied covenant with Nix, every
disciplinary action taken by her supervisor was not only authorized by the ECPP, but his actions
were further confirmed by the BOCC, who Nix concedes is the ultimate authority behind the ECPP.
Even though the ECPP is clearly without contractual authority, the District Court did
note in its decision that the provisions of the ECPP needed to be followed in good faith to satisfy the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Vol. 2, p.229 -231) This covenant, which exists
in both for-cause and at-will employment relationships, only applies to benefits or rights found under
an employment contract. Idaho does require that both parties in an employment agreement perform,
in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141
Idaho 233, 242, 108 P.3d 380, 389 (2005). While there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing with at-will employees, this does not create a duty for the employer to demonstrate cause for
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a termination. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 627, 778 P.2d 744, 749 (1989).
"The covenant does not protect the employee from a 'no cause' termination because tenure was never
a benefit inherent in the at-will agreement." Id. (citation omitted). However, there is protection
against an employer who simply terminates an employee in order to avoid payment to that employee
of benefits already earned, such as sales commissions. Id.
As established here, the ECPP is not part of Nix' s employment agreement because
it is specifically disclaimed as not part of any employment contract; thus, it cannot create explicit
contractual requirements under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, the
District Court still held that Elmore County complied with the provisions of the ECPP, and therefore
satisfied the covenant, through finding that Nix' s supervisor "followed the policy requiring notice
prior to discipline which could, and did, include placing her on probationary status as set out on page
33 of Exhibit A to the Steele Affidavit [R. Vol. 1, p. 191]." (R. Vol. 2, p. 231) A plain reading of
the ECPP states clearly that a supervisor has specific authority to impose discipline upon employees,
including placing employees on probationary status or even terminating their employment. (R. Vol.
1, p. 190-191) The ECPP also permits a supervisor to take any of the prescribed disciplinary actions
in any order that they deem necessary. (R. Vol. 1, p. 190-191) The BOCC specifically reviewed and
confirmed all disciplinary actions leading up to Plaintiff's termination, including actions of her
supervisor, Mr. Parsons. (R. Vol. 1, p. 75-77)
Nix' s termination was proper because the ECPP permits a supervisor to place an
employee on probationary status, and to maintain her at-will status, and further because the BOCC
confirmed both Plaintiffs probationary status prior to her termination, and the termination itself.
Nix has never produced evidence to rebut the District Court's prior holding that Nix has failed to
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show an issue of material fact exists that Elmore County breached this covenant. Thus, Mr. Parsons
followed the policy as written which allowed both placing Plaintiff on probationary status and
ultimately terminating her employment. These actions were subsequently confirmed by the BOCC.

D.

To the Extent That Other Claims Have Not Been Raised by Nix, They
Have Been Waived forAppeal.

Nix has failed to raise any other issues regarding the District Court's decisions,
including dismissing Nix's Third Cause of Action and the award of attorneys' fees and costs to
Elmore County. Nix has therefore waived these claims for appeal. See State v. Raudebaugh, 864
P.2d 596, 601 (1993). However, should the Court believe she has raised them in some fashion,
Elmore County requests leave to further brief these issues at a later date.
IV.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the District Court's decision
in total. Appellant has failed to set forth any meritorious argument as to why the District Court's
decision was in error or should be reversed. Further, this Court should award the DefendantRespondent its attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-117 where the Appellant's
arguments have no valid basis in law or fact.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
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